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Abstract: This article complements professor Schrepel’s observations by 
shedding light on how consensus rules can be built to automatically erase or 
create a hard fork for sensitive information when immutability no longer 
interests the parties to a cartel.     
By elaborating on how shifting from immutability to mutability and vice-
versa is the most relevant feature to turn blockchain into an unprecedented 
threat to fight cartels, this paper complements professor Shrepel’s 
observations on how blockchain can enhance opacity for outsiders and at the 
same time improve transparency for cartel members.  
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Collusion and blockchain 
The two most important works in blockchain and antitrust have 
been written by Utrecht Law School professor Thibault Schrepel, both 
published in 2019. Thibault’s works explain in details how blockchain works 
and why blockchain’s consensus rules can help create opportunities for both 
unilateral abuses and collusion. In this article I rely on professor Shrepel’s 
 
1 Forthcoming publication of the work in : “1 NOTRE DAME J. EMERGING 
TECH. ([2020]). “© [2019] Roberto Taufick. Individuals and nonprofit institutions 
may reproduce and distribute copies of this article in any format, at or below cost, 
for educational purposes, so long as each copy identifies the author, provides a 
citation to the Notre Dame Journal on Emerging Technologies, and includes this 
provision and copyright notice.” 
2 Invited Lecturer in Antitrust Law, Fundação Getulio Vargas. Master of in Law, 
Science and Technology, Stanford Law School. 2015 Gregory Terrill Cox Summer 
Research Fellow, John M. Olin Program in Law and Economics, Stanford 
University. Works recognized both nationally and internationally, including two 
nominations as best soft law in Concurrences’ 2019 Antitrust Writing Awards. 
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conceptual explorations of blockchain so as to limit the discussion in this 
paper to the use of the technology in conspiracies in restraint of trade, 
particularly cartels. This article complements professor Schrepel’s 
observations by shedding light on how consensus rules can be built to 
automatically erase sensitive information or create a hard fork when 
immutability no longer interests cartel members.     
First and foremost, one must take into account that the economics 
of collusion is always concerned with technologies that handle 
anonymization and tracking. While cartel detection depends heavily on the 
ability of authorities and society together to identify conspiracies in restraint 
of trade, the length of cartels also relies on the level of compliance with its 
internal rules -- in other words, on the ability of cartel members to oversee 
one another and on the effectiveness of sanctions for cartel defection. 
Inasmuch as tracking, anonymization and coercion are the pillars of an 
effective collusion, experts tend to look with skepticism at the flip side of 
innovations that offer privacy and sophisticated anti-piracy solutions34.  
Such skepticism is magnified by trustbusters’ historical inability to 
enforce the law against cartels, corroborated by the fact that it took quite long 
for cartel busters to develop and eventually apply leniency programs. In this 
regard, professor Thibault Schrepel5 raises the question if authorities are not 
 
3 For the purpose of this article, anti-piracy solutions are those designed to prevent 
copying and preserve things in their original condition (immutability). 
4 Professor Schrepel claims that immutability of registries would also increase 
compliance with the cartel, marketing it less necessary to rely on punishment: 
“Moreover, to the extent that the technology allows for binding agreements, the need 
to rely on the threat of punishment strategies diminishes, which make collusive 
outcomes more stable compared to such outcomes in noncooperative games.” 
(Shrepel, 2019(a)). 
5“We shall therefore address whether the success of leniency applications is put into 
danger by blockchain. In other words, if the destabilization of game strategies is 
limited by the technology. If that is the case, we shall then discuss whether this would 
be problematic. After all, several studies estimate that the percentage of detected 
cartels is only between 10% and 33% in the post-World War II era, which proves 
that leniency procedures are not sufficient in themselves. Perhaps antitrust and 
competition agencies give them too much importance, which the blockchain will 
help to correct. And if only 12 % of cartels ended naturally, blockchain may change 
that too.  
[...]By undermining the effectiveness of leniency, blockchain will force competition 
agencies to become proactive again in order to readjust the balance, failing which 
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relying too much in leniency, a tool has proved to be of low effectiveness. 
His concern is confirmed by extensive data. Studies from the European 
Commission, for instance, claim that detection tends to be lower in cartels6. 
Studies of Connor and publications from the OECD show that we detect circa 
30% of the total number of cartels and that punishment is still quite low in 
most jurisdictions7.  
That notwithstanding, the high levels of deterrence in the US and 
in Canada and recent progress made by other jurisdictions -- also 
incentivized by the US, aware of cross-border effects of global cartels -- 
have, according Connor, been enough to raise concern from conspirators and 
increase deterrence. It is in this context of slow but persisting progress -- now 
powered by stimuli to private enforcement as a tool to complement public 
 
companies will have a growing sense of immunity from antitrust and competition 
law. In addition, strengthening proactive detection will increase the risk of 
punishment, and thus will force companies to seek leniency again; it is a true virtual 
circle. We therefore recommend that agencies focus their best efforts in this direction 
while keeping in mind that their detection work will be complicated by the ‘opacity 
effect’ created by blockchain. But the screening of collusive agreements remains 
possible on certain aspects, notably on market behaviors, which must be put at the 
center of antitrust and competition agencies’ attention.” (2019, a) 
6 “Even in the most effective system of private enforcement, not all the harm to 
consumers and other victims reflected in the above estimates will be compensated: 
this is because, inter alia, a considerable number of antitrust infringements will 
remain undetected. For hardcore cartels, the detection rate is generally assumed to 
be no more than somewhere between 10% and 20%. For other infringements, the 
detection rate is higher, but the ‘conviction’ rate (i.e. the rate of successful damages 
actions) is likely to be much lower, since claimants often find it very difficult to 
produce proof that the contested conduct produced actual anti-competitive effects. It 
also has to be assumed that some victims do not come forward to claim 
compensation, for instance because they prefer not to disrupt an ongoing business 
relationship with the infringer. Moreover, in some instances, victims will find it 
rather difficult to convince courts of a sufficiently close causal link between any 
particular damage and the infringement.” [EC, 2008(a)] 
7 Connor. John M (2007) (2011). See also OECD (2005) and EC (2008, a). 
According to Connor, “[l]ooking at data on only contemporary international cartels, 
price effects seem undiminished. A sample of 284 private international cartels 
discovered since 1990 results in median estimated overcharges of 26% (Connors and 
Helmers 2006). Combine this mean with projected sales results in global injuries of 
more than $500 billion (in real 2005 dollars). This study finds that the mean 
overcharges of global cartels were about 30%.” 
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enforcement8 -- that one must understand that the development and use of 
technologies that most authorities take time to master can obstruct the path 
to competition on the merits and contain the slow but progressive movement 
towards greater antitrust enforcement. At the same time, it is also in this 
context that we are nonetheless bound to look at Schumpeterian innovations 
that also raise welfare and try to fight what can be used to cause perfidious 
attacks on competition -- at the same time avoiding the risk of contaminating 
our ability to take advantage of what is special in them and can serve us well, 
even in the fight against cartels.       
So far technologies have created efficient ways to protect privacy 
by encrypting messages or by anonymizing users, raising parallel concerns 
that perpetrators of illegal activities would be shielded from ordinary 
investigations. In any case, the existence of a central unit -- the ultimate 
parent entity -- compelled by law to store sufficient information to hold the 
perpetrator accountable for the illicit activity avoids perfect anonymization. 
Yet no tool had proved to deserve enough trust when it comes to 
ensuring that shared or distributed information is true. Much of the historical 
distrust in digital technologies comes from the fact that digital products can 
be copied and distributed as duplicates. Correcting that flaw usually 
demanded the use of a clearinghouse whose task was building a reputation 
as an efficient ex post identifier of fraud and of credit bureaus that screened 
one’s past commitment to honoring debts. As we all know, both 
intermediaries delivered poor performance due to incomplete and untimely 
information.   
Blockchain promised to remedy both. First, public blockchains like 
bitcoin are created to have no central authority and allow that both the nature 
of the operations and the people behind them are anonymized by hashing. 
Second, every register in blockchain was supposed to be unique -- without 
digital copies -- and immutable -- not possible to edit. As we will see, 
governance of blockchain platforms can trigger either of them: be it by means 
of hard forks (that create copies), be it by 51 percent attacks (that can delete, 
or edit data).  
The ability to operate against blockchains original purpose also 
makes it possible to design the characteristics that, as we discuss in this 
paper, seem to be blockchain’s most relevant feature for the economics of 
 
8 EC (2009, a), EC (2009, b). 
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collusion: protecting the identity of the users and at the same time offering a 
solution to apparent conflicting purposes, that is, keeping an impeccable 
record of the members’ relevant transactions during the cartel’s regular 
operation and as a time bomb under signs of defection or threats of 
whistleblowing. 
Anonymity 
The financial system uses an intermediary -- the trusted central 
authority -- to check double spending in every single transaction9. The 
preservation of the intermediary is regarded as both costly and unreliable, as 
financial crises have taught us.  
Instead of checking after each operation how dependable each 
business partner is, the most reliable system would be one where payees 
would know in advance the history of payments of each purchaser, choosing 
the partners according to the level of risk that the payee is open to take. Credit 
bureaus have been designed to accomplish said mission, but they too fall 
short of the quality information or information treatment that would offer 
complete and tailor-made data. 
Because the solution to imperfect information is granting a 
complete and public record of the business operations, blockchain was 
created to allow that people check all information that the relevant partner 
shared on a platform built on top of it. In public blockchains, information is 
made available on public addresses created by hashing the public key. Even 
though it is not possible to reverse engineer a public key from the possession 
of public addresses, it is possible by design to get to public addresses by 
knowing someone’s public key. The public key is the hashing or encrypted 
public interface of someone who has an account or a wallet in blockchain. 
Blockchain was created under the belief that today’s financial 
system’s privacy model can be improved if transactions are made public but 
at the same time the identity of the involved parties is protected. Blockchain 
would not only increase transaction transparency, but also sustain the 
anonymity of the parties in each transaction.  
 
9 “After each transaction, the coin must be returned to the mint to issue a new coin, 
and only coins issued directly from the mint are trusted not to be double-spent.” 
(Nakamoto, 2008). 




Blockchain enhances anonymity by identifying each transaction 
party and each operation by means of cryptography -- the so called hashing 
functions. Blockchain creates hashing functions by means of asymmetric 
encryption using both the public and the private keys.  
Each wallet has a private key -- that is supposed to be immutable 
and secret, accessible only by the wallet owner -- by means of which each 
transaction concerning one’s wallet is authorized. Private keys generate 
public keys, that is how contracting and third parties can identify whom they 
are contracting with. Public keys are created by a derivation of the private 
keys and, unlike private keys, do not directly identify who is behind that 
wallet.  
Public keys are made public in every transaction (transactions are 
identified by hashed public addresses): If, on the one hand, it protects the 
anonymity of those who need to supply or to be supplied without 
identification, it becomes possible for institutional players to offer more 
reliability over a transaction by publicly linking its name to a specific public 
account or public key. Nothing prevents that institution from keeping a 
separate shadow account with public keys that is not made public by the 
institution and that is used for other -- including illicit -- purposes.  
Although it is possible to link all the operations to a public key -- 
that does not offer in itself clues as to who is behind those operations -, one 
can make it more difficult to track the history of transactions by linking each 
transaction to a unique address. In fact, for privacy purposes each blockchain 
transaction is by default linked to a unique address. Hence people whom one 
does business with can not see the other addresses that one owns.   
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In a sum, blockchain offers pairs of keys that do not identify who 
is on the other side of each operation and sequences of hashed public 
addresses that do not offer evidence of what is behind each specific 
transaction or fact of life. Blockchains anonymity is assured because neither 
is it possible to retrieve a public key from public addresses, nor derive the 
private key from public keys. In any case, the degree of anonymity can be 
attenuated by means of voluntary disclosure.  
Traceability 
Blockchain emerged as a technology that would improve our way 
to keep records of events by turning registers immutable. As a consequence, 
blockchain technology could be a source of either a perfect registry whereby 
cartelists would improve compliance and sanctioning inside a cartel or, 
conversely, of evidence that would provide public authorities with easier 
means to prove the existence of cartels and even helping them demand 
stronger evidence from defected firms on the line for leniency. 
Bitcoin’s introductory article10 puts trust and traceability as a 
cornerstone to develop a new coin using a trustworthy technology that keeps 
records unchanged. According to the paper, the financial system suffers from 
“the inherent weaknesses of the trust based model.” The answer to the 
imperfect system is to substitute “an electronic payment system based on 
cryptographic proof” for the unreliable financial intermediary. 
At its very inception the technology aimed at providing an 
immutability solution to today’s trust system. As argued by bitcoin’s 
formulator, “[t]ransactions that are computationally impractical to reverse 
would protect sellers from fraud, and routine escrow mechanisms could 
easily be implemented to protect buyers.” As a consequence, Satoshi 
Nakamoto built blockchain as a system that would deter reversibility not by 
designing a superior technology -- that would eventually and earlier than 
desirable be superseded by a new and more disruptive technology -, but by 
relying on the extreme deconcentration of the power to coin and act as a 
clearinghouse for financial operations. Quoting bitcoin’s quasi-manifesto11: 
 
10 Nakamoto (2008). 
11 Nakamoto (2008). 
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In this paper, we propose a solution to the double-spending problem 
using a peer-to-peer distributed timestamp server to generate 
computational proof of the chronological order of transactions. The 
system is secure as long as honest nodes collectively control more 
CPU power than any cooperating group of attacker nodes. 
[...] we proposed a peer-to-peer network using proof-of-work to record 
a public history of transactions that quickly becomes computationally 
impractical for an attacker to change if honest nodes control a majority 
of CPU power. [...] They vote with their CPU power, expressing their 
acceptance of valid blocks by working on extending them and 
rejecting invalid blocks by refusing to work on them. Any needed rules 
and incentives can be enforced with this consensus mechanism. 
To make it clearer, blockchain was never built as capable of 
delivering per se an immutable registry. Blockchain would only be a reliable 
means to prevent bitcoin double-spending if at the same time the incentives 
to become block miners or nodes were high enough to make the system be 
operational -- so that the operations would be validated in a timely manner -
- and, despite the incentives, the nodes were atomized. If blockchain failed 
in any of those conditions, it would be either unoperational or unreliable. In 
the first case, it would fail because the means to achieve immutability were 
improper. In the latter, it would fail in its ends, insofar as concentration of 
power would still place us in the trust system that makes us all dependent 
upon the reputation of the financial intermediary or trusted central authority.  
Due to its relationship with economic power, the second case is the 
one that matters for us in this paper.  
Mutability 
Blockchain is generally defined as a digital ledger. As such its main 
purpose is to serve as a more reliable register of facts of life. To serve that 
purpose, blockchain needs dependable immutability guarantees in such a 
way as to make fraud statistically meaningless. 
Blockchain is not unitary, though. In other words, it is a technology 
on top of which diverse solutions apply. Because, as we saw, immutability 
in blockchain depends on both the existence of incentives to join the 
platforms as block validating nodes and the atomization of the power to 
validate the blocks, it is critical to understand how all the solutions developed 
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on top of blockchain can guarantee that both conditions are filled. The first 
step in that direction involves understanding the differences between public 
(or permissionless) and private (or permissioned) blockchains.  
Public blockchain solutions rely on the atomization of miners to 
consolidate immutability. The atomizations is the natural consequence of 
open access. 
In most open blockchains, there is no guarding against bad actors and 
no access control, thanks in part to the original influence of the open 
source and cypherpunk movements. Applications may be added to the 
network without the approval or trust of others, allowing the 
blockchain to function as a platform layer. In practice, some public 
blockchains only permit a finite number of actions to be contained in 
a transaction, perhaps only allowing their users to send tokens among 
them. But most public blockchains do not impose such limitations. 
Transactions are generally secured by merely requiring new entries to 
include a proof of work.12 
Conversely, private blockchains rely on the reputation of a central 
authority that has the power to restrict participation to a club of persons. 
Central to private blockchains’ is the entity’s ability to build a new 
governance that builds stronger reliance either on the immutability or on the 
resilience of the registries.      
Private blockchains are subdivided into two different categories. The 
first is called ‘single entity blockchain.’ As its name suggests, a single 
entity will set up the protocol and run the blockchain, while reading 
permission may be public or restricted to certain participants. The 
second is called ‘consortium blockchain.’ In such a blockchain, the 
consensus process is controlled by a pre-selected set of nodes.13 
Last, there are semi-private blockchains. “Those blockchains are 
run by a single company that grants access to any qualified user.”14 
 
 
12 Shrepel (2019 (b)). 
13 Shrepel (2019 (b)). 
14 Shrepel (2019 (b)). 
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Shrepel 2019(b). 
Regardless of its configuration, blockchain promises both unheard-
of anonymity and traceability at the transaction level. Even though there has 
been no “big but” when it comes to protecting anonymity yet -- or else we 
would already know who Satoshi Nakamoto is by tracking his, her, or their 
account -, immutability has been a risk to be controlled from blockchain’s 
inception. As we will see, although blockchain’s immutability as a whole is 
not entirely dependable, the degree of mistrust grows reversely proportional 
to the levels of publicity15. 
The confirmation of blockchain’s operations depends on different 
consensus rules. The most well known rule is the proof of work, whereby 
blocks are validated according to the ability of nodes’ CPUs to do a specific 
 
15 “Second, the definition states that data on both private and public, permissioned 
and permissionless, ledgers is immutable. Despite the fact that it is unresolved 
whether different variations of blockchain technology give rise to immutable 
records, the statute explicitly treats public and private ledgers as if they have 
identical capabilities. Does the statute suggest that data on private blockchains 
should be treated as immutable, even if these ledgers have a much weaker claim to 
this property?” Walch (2017). 
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job: “incrementing a nonce in the block until a value is found that gives the 
block's hash the required zero bits”16. The block can be changed, but it 
requires redoing the work. Again: Blocks are not immutable, but changing 
blocks requires higher CPU capacity to assure that competing nodes would 
not stand a chance in mining. The job becomes even more complicated as 
more blocks are chained in: “As later blocks are chained after it, the work to 
change the block would include redoing all the blocks after it.”17 
Poof of work was created as a means to avoid that economic power 
concentrated the decisions in the hands of a few. According to Nakamoto’s 
article, “Proof-of-work is essentially one-CPU-one-vote.” That 
notwithstanding, proof of work did not solve the market power issue. As 
claimed in Nakamoto’s piece: 
[...] The majority decision is represented by the longest chain, which 
has the greatest proof-of-work effort invested in it. If a majority of 
CPU power is controlled by honest nodes, the honest chain will grow 
the fastest and outpace any competing chains. To modify a past block, 
an attacker would have to redo the proof-of-work of the block and all 
blocks after it and then catch up with and surpass the work of the 
honest nodes. We will show later that the probability of a slower 
attacker catching up diminishes exponentially as subsequent blocks 
are added. 
In fact, the probability that an attack happens is not that low: It only 
depends on the concentration of the mining power. Clearly, the more blocks 
one needs to have changed, the harder it is to operate the change. Even 
dominant nodes would have a hard time trying to change two consecutive 
blocks before other nodes confirm one block only. But dynamics can change 
depending both on the unilateral dominance of a certain quasi-monopolist or 
in the existence of collusion between major nodes18.  
Mutability becomes a bigger threat as the nodes have incentives to 
collaborate with each other. As we better understand blockchain and how 
 
16 Nakamoto (2008). 
17 Nakamoto (2008). 
18 Professor Shrepel adds that: “Thanks to Bitcoin, this is currently the world’s most 
used consensus mechanism. It has the advantage of allowing a relatively random 
distribution of block validation operations, which limits the risk of collusion, but 
suffers from the power it requires as well as scaling issues.” 
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governance rules can be built to -- in a non transparent fashion and under 
specific conditions designed by the parties -- clear registries and hide past 
transactions, it becomes clearer that blockchain can become an effective ally 
to conspiracies in restraint of trade and lower the levels of cartel detection. It 
should be clear at this point that assured anonymity and malleable 
traceability altogether change the balance of blockchain in favor of cartel 
proliferation.    
Governance 
The way found by blockchain founder(s) to guarantee immutability 
was a governance rule. Nakamoto’s instinct followed the logic that any 
corporate lawyer understands: Ultimately, the best way to keep a rule 
unaltered is by demanding unanimity. But because in an idealistically 
dispersed universe of block validators demanding unanimity was tantamount 
to blocking and insofar as some degree of flexibility is desirable from the 
perspective of market adaptability, majority quora or poison pills seemed 
more adequate to approve of changes that should happen only under 
exceptional circumstances.  
In that sense, blockchain was originally formulated to work under 
a simple majority rule: Bitcoin -- the first use built over a blockchain 
platform -- demanded a 51 percent majority to confirm blocks of operations. 
Blockchain was also designed to an atomized market of miners. When votes 
are dispersed into a multitude of voters, reaching a majority demands large 
acceptance, which brings legitimacy to a decision that is no longer 
concentrated in those who have economic power. But, again, majority quora 
alone would not suffice: Validation, voting or mining power needed to be 
dispersed so as to guarantee the prevalence of honest nodes.  
Blockchain was then built to work not only as a digital ledger, but 
as a distributed one, where new data is only added to the chain if it is 
approved by a majority of honest atomized miners. Votes in blockchain are 
not one-IP-one-vote19, though. As mentioned earlier, the power to validate 
 
19 Professor Shrepel (2019(b) explains that “[...] some blockchains are already 
implementing new mechanisms on top of the consensus in order to create more 
sophisticated governances.For instance, Dash, a crypto-currency, uses a governance 
system that allows its users to vote if they hold tokens. Decred and Tezos are also 
crypto-currencies with more centralized governance systems. In fact, one of Tezos’ 
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operations depends on computing power, a combination of the number of 
CPUs that one owns and the power of those machines used to mine. For 
professional miners, it is basically the number of CPUs that count20.   
Distribution of power aimed at diluting the chances of dishonest 
attacks to the system. Another key aspect of systems using blockchain lies in 
that miners or nodes -- or any other way that validators are called -- can vote 
to supersede existing blocks or even give birth to hard forks, where there are 
two, or more registries of the same timeline coexisting in different systems 
with different factfindinds. Hard forks can also be created to preserve 
information that would otherwise be deleted from the blockchain’s registry.    
The big “if” about bitcoin was precisely that is was built under the 
assumption that a proof of work consensus rule would survive under a 
dispersed basis of miners. As bitcoin and -- later on -- other over-the-top21 
services flourished under a more concentrated environment of miners, the 
real concern about bitcoin started being the precise problem blockchain was 
created to solve: The mutability of registries. As professor Shrepel22 defines 
it, “[w]hoever controls the consensus — also known as the consensus 
mechanism — controls the governance of the blockchain”. According to 
him23:  
As a result, fewer than 10 mining pools dominated Bitcoin in 2017. In 
fact, the 7 most powerful ones accounted for more than 85% of all 
transactions validated on the Bitcoin blockchain. This calls into 
question the proclaimed decentralized nature of Bitcoin because the 
owning of more than 51% of mining power is equivalent to a control 
of the blockchain. 
 
main characteristics is its ability to amend its consensus when necessary. Further, 
more traditional systems such as “off-chain” and “sidechain” mechanisms are in 
development. The mechanism called BIP 9 already allows Bitcoin developers to 
probe miners about technical changes. By doing so, blockchains supplement the sole 
consensus mechanism (and create new opportunities for unilateral conduct).” 
20 “The system is secure as long as honest nodes collectively control more CPU 
power than any cooperating group of attacker nodes.” [Nakamoto, 2008] 
21 Running on top of blockchain.  
22 2019(b). 
23 2019(a). 
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As concentration of power takes place, registries can be altered, 
making it easier for the existence of hard forks and for the proliferation of 51 
percent attacks24.  
Governance to conspire in restraint of trade 
So far we have analyzed the odds of attacking public blockchains. 
That was a very important exercise to explain how blockchain consensus rule 
is actually frail and concentration exists both in public, quasi-public and 
private blockchains. 
In the universe of collusion, however, mutability is an easier task 
that depicted in the preceding chapters. Mutability is facilitated because our 
main concern lies in the use of permissioned or private blockchains to share 
data and eventually conceal information if defection happens inside a 
conspiracy. In other words, collusion does not depend on the mutability of 
public blockchains: Instead, it can even be built on top of algorithms that rely 
on data coming from public blockchains, but the agreement will be better 
protected if data is shared and rules are set forth confined to private 
blockchains. 
Intuitively, blockchain is used when parties do not trust each other 
and need evidence of a transaction or fact of time. It can also be used when 
the parties need evidence before third parties -- in which case blockchain is 
useful because the third party does not trust the members of the blockchain, 
regardless of how they feel between each other. The following table 
illustrates possible sets of options between public and private blockchains 






24 “As defined by Walch, “[a] 51 percent attack could occur if a party or colluding 
group controlled at least 51 percent of the computing power of the network, allowing 
them to determine what is recorded to the network’s records, and potentially to revise 
the existing record.”  
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do not trust 
Public Public Public 
Arantes (2019). Free translation from Portuguese. 
As one can identify from the board above, private blockchains can 
be recommended if the users know the nodes enough to be sure that they do 
not trust each other and will oversee each other’s activities. Non-alignment 
is essential for third parties to believe that the nodes will not conspire to 
change the registries. That is true even if the users do not have reason to trust 
the nodes.  
To better understand the statement, we pick up the example of a 
monopolist node. Because aligned nodes share common interests, they will 
work as if they were one entity or one economic group. And because 
whenever nodes behave as one sole entity or group they do not oversee and 
report misbehaviors of each other -- rather joining forces to deceive third 
parties -, they are not fit to be trusted as validators of private blockchains. 
However, even when private blockchains are used to help 
transactions of nodes that do not trust each other, certain events can trigger 
alignment in the course of events between the nodes of small private 
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blockchains. When alignment happens, blockchain’s pro-immutability 
argument does not apply25. 
Nakamoto’s model was since its inception projected having in 
mind a possible attack of a corrupt against an honest chain of nodes. But 
according to him, “[n]odes are not going to accept an invalid transaction as 
payment, and honest nodes will never accept a block containing them. An 
attacker can only try to change one of his own transactions to take back 
money he recently spent.”26 Because Nakamoto was concerned with a public 
blockchain called bitcoin, he was not designing algorithms to prevent fraud 
inside private blockchains conceived of for dishonest purposes -- in which 
case all the nodes, or most of them (in the case of a cartel with a defected 
party)  would be aligned to erase or adulterate the chain.   
Immutability is not, then, an intrinsic characteristics of blockchain. 
Immutability, particularly in small permissioned networks, depends on the 
presence of miners -- voters, validators or nodes -- whose interests are not 
aligned. As mentioned by Gladstone Arantes27, users or developers should 
only trust platforms whose nodes are not cooperative and therefore have no 
reason to be dishonest.  
Thus, it is to be expected that a large number of cases will fall into the 
Know/Do not trust column [....]  (they know each other, but there is 
no mutual trust). At first, because the users do not trust the nodes, one 
would expect that the use of a public blockchain was necessary. But if 
users know that the nodes do not trust each other either, they may 
believe that a private blockchain is enough, since surveillance between 
nodes could guarantee their own trust. The best solution is only 
available on a case-by-case basis. [free translation from Portuguese] 
When the nodes of private blockchains are aligned and cooperate 
in their self interest, then open platforms -- because we expect that they be 
 
25 One of the greatest problems lies in the diffused knowledge that blockchain cannot 
be altered. As Walch claims, “[t]he secret meaning of ‘hard to change’ does not seem 
to have reached the academics,consultants, thought leaders,  and regulators who 
continue to state without qualification that blockchain technology creates 
immutable,permanent, unchangeable, indelible records.” 
26 Nakamoto (2008). 
27 2019. 
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less concentrated and that the chances that their  nodes are cooperative be 
lower -- are the more appropriate environment to find trust.  
Designing the cartel rules inside small private blockchains 
In contracts between few entities, the immutability argument is 
stronger if all the involved need approve the changes in order to have them 
effective. That sounds like a good rule if the only purpose is to defend the 
parties against confidence attacks from outsiders or against each other.  
Blockchain becomes complicated when people want transparency 
and immutability to be protected against fraud, but at the same time need 
opacity and mutability to be shielded against knowledge from third parties28. 
In other words, the contract must be immutable for the first group, but not in 
relation to the latter. Cartels can benefit from this design.   
The use of blockchain’s design to implement cartels strategy is not 
unheard-of. In fact, it has been reported by Nakamoto as cause to the 51 
percent and the double spending attacks. The great difference here lies in the 
fact that, unlike public blockchains, the private ones can be built 
incorporating governance rules that aim at making it possible to do the block 
change that blockchain solutions usually regard as pernicious to their 
business models.  
As claimed by professor Schrepel29, “[a] blockchain’s ability to 
implement anticompetitive strategies will vary depending on the governance 
system of the blockchain.” In our understanding, cartels are prone to use 
private blockchains fundamentally as a hybrid tool that offers immutability 
and publicity to the nodes and at the same time supplies opacity and 
mutability as regards the outsider. For cartel purposes, the best rule is one 
designed to afford immutability as regards the operation of the cartel, but one 
than can also serve the purposes of the members of the cartel when one of 
them defects and collaborates with the authorities. Even though the OECD 
launched a paper a year before on blockchain30 and challenges ahead, 
 
28 Professor Shrepel (2019 (a)) calls them “ the ‘visibility effect’ created by 
blockchain for the cartelist as well as the ‘opacity effect’ created outside the collusive 
agreements.” 
29 2019 (b). 
30 OECD (2018). 
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Professor Shrepel (2019(a)) was the first to bring this possibility to our 
attention: 
As far as private blockchains are concerned, they may allow an on-
demand exit from the agreement while ensuring the deletion of data. 
This is utterly attractive for potential colluders. More generally, 
considering the fact that the owner of a private blockchain retains the 
right to override, edit, and delete the entries on the blockchain, or even 
to modify the blockchain functioning itself, it cannot be used as 
intangible evidence to prove participation in collusion. [...] 
Nonetheless, by allowing the parties to delete their data and 
transactions, colluders may remain safe from detection. Only a copy 
of the data held by another colluder could potentially put them into 
great danger. 
Usually, cartel members would not be able to detect defection 
before the dawn raid or -- even after they do -- easily detect who defected. 
That means that the anti-leniency rule in the smart contract would only apply 
in specific cases where a dawn raid starts and the parties must decide based 
on a pre established majority rule to erase the information. This is a very 
plausible scenario, as dawn raids take place in the premises of all the 
members of the cartel at the same time. The algorithms must then be designed 
to accommodate a smart rule giving more flexibility to erase the whole 
history in such cases. 
There are many smart solutions that fit this context, including a 
specific quorum to change data when the cartel is working ordinarily -- 
unanimity would work in smaller groups, in order to assure immutability of 
the transactions and cartel surveillance -- and another to delete or to fork all 
data to another private blockchain where an independent third party elected 
by a quorum of the members of the cartel will be the only one to have access 
to the history of collusion. In the fork option, there must also be a specific 
command to erase all the data if defection is confirmed and the independent 
third party hears of cartel investigations regarding the members of that 
private blockchain. 
Professor Shrepel31 also brings to attention that smart contracts can 
automate sanctioning by automatically transferring tokens depending on the 
 
31 2019 (a). 
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behavior of the cartelist. Smart contracts would also be able to automatically 
exclude those who infringe the law of the cartel32.  
Subverting the incentives to defect 
Monetary sanctions can however be very detrimental to the opacity 
of the agreement. As can also be “printscreen”, photo shooting and sharing 
of data from the defecting cartelist that precede the dawn raids. Because the 
dawn raid is usually the watershed that will trigger reaction from the 
members of the cartel, it is half correct to say that the cartel may only take 
the necessary measures when it is already too late and therefore blockchain 
may not increase underdeterrence as propagated. 
That view is not correct because it fails to see half of the facts. 
Because with blockchain conspirators are subject to better enforcement of 
the cartel rules and because opacity of those rules is increased to the observer, 
the incentives to defect become minimal. In fact, the technology subverts 
today’s incentives to blow the whistle.  
Defection usually happens when there is fear that the cartel will be 
dismantled by public authorities (traditional leniency) or when someone has 
been caught for a cartel and wants to have the sanctions reduced by giving 
notice of another conspiracy (leniency plus). In any case, defection is either 
a consequence of fear that the cartel will be dismantled by public authorities 
-- which leads to a race to receive the lowest number in the marker system -
- or the effect of past law enforcement. In both cases, the ultimate reason for 
defection is risk aversion to law enforcement.  
As opacity escalates, the risk of law enforcement falls drastically. 
Lower risks of law enforcement and greater risks of sanctions inside the 
cartel shield the agreement against collaboration with authorities. At the 
same time, if law enforcement falls, the number of persons available to 
leniency plus agreements also drops.  
 
32 2019 (a). “Smart contracts may be used to exit collusive agreements, whether it is 
to force the exclusion of a deviant colluder (1), or for a company to manage its own 
exit from it (2). These automated exits might be organized in accordance with several 
pre- established rules, ultimately leading to new challenges for antitrust and 
competition agencies.” 
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That leads to the conclusion that even though blockchain and smart 
contracts build better solutions to preserve cartel member from the effects of 
defection and cartel settlements, that improvement is marginal as regards the 
amelioration of the governance of the cartel and a considerable fall in the risk 
of deterrence.    
Final remarks 
The findings of our work confirm professor Shrepel’s33 
understanding that governance is the key aspect in designing cartels using 
blockchain technology. We confirm that the consensus rule can also be 
adjusted both to create trust in the information shared but also offer smart 
mechanisms to replace blocks of data or fork them in a way to protect the 
members against defection.  
On top of that, we shed light on how a combination of mutability 
and immutability -- instead of immutability alone -- is the most relevant 
feature to turn blockchain into an unprecedented threat to fight cartels. In this 
sense, this paper complements professor Shrepel’s observations on how 
blockchain can enhance opacity for outsiders and at the same time improve 
transparency for cartel members. 
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